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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
THb SNYDER MINES INCORPORATED, a corporation,
Plaintiff
vs.

Case No. 7310

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH, Department of Employment Security,

Defendant

DEFENDANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On the 9th day of January, 1941, a representative of the
Department of Employment Security of the Industrial Commission of -Utah entered a determination to the effect that
certain lessees, under lease agreement with The Snyder Mines,
Incorporated, had performed services (tin employment" for
that company during the calendar years 1936, 1937, 1938 and
1939 and that unemployment compensation contributions were
due in the amount of $10,892.69 on the wages paid these men.
The company disagreed with this determination, and on
the 18th day of January, 1941, filed an appeal. The hearing
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on appeal before the Appeal Tribunal was postponed by an
agreement of the parties pending a decision in the Combined
Metals and National Tunnel & Mines cases.
On the 23rd day of February, 1943, a representative of
the Department rendered an additional determination which
held in effect that for the years 1940, 1941 and 1942 the
company had failed to pay contributions on wages received
by lessees, truckers and Mr. E. H. Snyder, President of the
company, and that the services of these individuals were
performed ccin employment" with the company. The company
disagreed with this determination, and on the 2nd day of
March, 1943, filed an appeal.
Both appeals were heard by the Appeal Referee on the
dates of June 15, July 13 and August 12 (circumstances having
necessitated continuances). The Appeals Referee, .on the
19th day of August, 1943, rendered his decision affirming the
determination of the Department representative.
On the 27th day of August, 1943, The Snyder Mines,
Incorporated filed an appeal from the decision of the Referee
and asked for a hearing on the said appeal before the Industrial Commission of Utah as provided by law. The Commission took no action on the company's request for further
hearing· on appeal until November 22, 1948, at which time
they notified the company that· a hearing would be held on
November 29 in the Governor's Board Room of the State
Capitol Building. On the 1st day of March, 1949, the Industrial Commission affirmed the decision of the Referee and
thereby in effect affirmed the decision of the representative.
4
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

I.
Lessees
The lessees in question performed servtces pursuant to
written lease agreements which were similar in all material
respects to the agreements invoJved in the case of Combined
Metals Reduction Company, et al vs. Industrial Commission
of Utah, 101 Utah 230: 116 Pac. 2d 929 and National Tunnel
& Mines Corporation vs. Industrial Commission of Utah, 99
Utah 39: 102 Pac. 2d 514.
As indicated by the petitioner on page 3 and 4 of its
brief, the question regarding lessees is not as to whether or
not the lessees were performing services (tin employment" but
rather, ''the question remains whether the Commission exceeded
its jurisdiction, -acted in excess of its jurisdiction, or proceded
improperly against petitioner."

II.
.Services of E. H. Snyder
E. H. Snyder vvas president of The Snyder Mines, Incorporated during the period in question, and he performed
services of a professional nature for a regular monthly salary.
As indicated in the testimony, which is summarized on page
6 and 7 of the petitioner's brief, E. H. Snyder was Vice President and General Manager of Combined Metals Reduction
Company as well as the President of The Snyder Mines In""
corporated. His superior knu~.vledge of metallurgical conditions was used by the latter company in making decisions
regarding ore trends in the mtne.

s
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III.
Truckers
The company engaged several individuals to operate company-owned trucks, and in addition, from time to time it made
arrangements with men in the district who owned their own
trucks to haul ore and waste for the company. Those men
were paid either by the ton hauled or in certain instances by
the hours that they and their trucks were retained. They worked
only during the hours that the company-operated shovels were
working, and to quote a letter from the company: ((These
trucks must dispose of ore or waste in whatever manner we
direct." In the main the truckers engaged were formerly employed by the Bothv1ell Company, and the hauling was done
primarily on the Snyder Mines property. The effective rate
was $.25per ton hauled and the men were paid twice a month
on the regular settling-up days.

DEFENDANT'S ARGl)MENT
I.
THE LESSEES, TRUCKERS, AND E. H. SNYDER
WERE PERFORMING SERVICES IN EMPLOYMENT FOR
THE PLAINTIFF FOR WAGES.
Section 42-2a-19(j) (1) and 19(j) (5) (Utah Employment
Security Act) contain definitions of employment as follows:

(( (j) ( 1)

(Employment' means any service performed
prior to January 1, 1941, which was employment as defined in the Utah Unemployment Compensation Lav.'

6;
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prior to the effective date of this act, and subject to the
other provisions of this sub-section, service performed
after December 31, 1940, including service in interstate commerce, and service as an officer of a corporation performed for wages or under any contract of hire,
v1ritten or oral, express or implied."
(j) ( 5) Services performed by an individual for
vtages or under any contract of hire, written or oral,
express or in1plied, shall be deemed to be employtnent
subject to this act unless and until it is shown to the
satisfaction of the Commission thatu

(A) such individual has been and will continue to
be free from control or direction over the performance
of such services, both under his contract of hire and
in fact; and
tc

(B) such service is either outside the usual course
of the busines for which such·- service is performed or
that such service is performed outside of all the places
of business of ·the enterprise for \vhich such service
is performed; and
tt

(C) such individual is customarily engaged .11 an independently established trade, occupation, profession,
or business of the same nature as that involved in the
contract of service.''
tc

Section 42-2a-19(h) (2) of the Utah Employment Se<.u rity Act provides:
2) Each individual employed to perforr:(} or to
assist in performing the work of any person in the
service of an employing unit shall be deen1ed to be
engaged by such employing unit for all the purposes
of this act whether such individual was hired or oaid
l
directly by such employing unit or by such person,
provided the employing unit had actual or constructive
knowledge of the work."
tc (

7
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In several cases decided by this court prior to 1943 this
court upheld the theory that the aforementioned provision was
intended to be broader in scope than the common law test of
master and servant. In the case of Singer Sewing Machine Company vs. Industrial Commission, et al, 104 Utah 175; 134 P. 2nd
479, decided in 1943, this court set out in detail the principles
and application of the above-quoted section as the court saw
it, and we quote:
c CThe examination of these optntons reveals that the
members of this court are committed to the following:

(a) The unemployment compensation law was enacted under and as an exercise of the police power of
the state.
(C

(b) Its purpose is remedial to protect the health,
morals, and welfare of the people by providing a cushion
against the shocks and rigors of unemployment.
(C

(c) Being remedial under the police power and not
imposing limitations on basic rights, it should be liberally construed.
ct

(d) (Employment' under the act is- not contned to
common law concepts, or to the relationship of master
and servant, but is expanded to embrace all services
rendered for another for wages.
(C

(e) The terms (employment,' (personal services' and
(wages' are much broader in meaning and application
than their common law counterparts, and encompass in
their coverage many persons and relationships not included in the common law relationship of master and
servant.
(C

(f) All situations where one rendering services for
another for (wages' is under the direction and control of
u

8
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such other in the rendering of such service, are service
relationships within Sec. 19 (j) ( 1) of the act.
(g) The absence of direction and control does not
necessarily exclude the parties, or the relationship from
the operations or scope of the act.
"(h) In determining if the relationship is within the
act, the Commission and the court will look behind the
contract to the actual situation-the status in vvhich
the parties are placed by the relationship that exists
between them.
i) The test is twofold: Did he render personal service for another? If so, was he entitled to remuneration
(wages) therefor? If both are found, the relationship
is within the act.
(j) If the relationship is within the act, we J.pply
Section 19(j) (5) to determine if he is entitled to
benefits, provided the claimant meets all other requirements of the act to bring him within its provisions.
c ( k)
Section 19 ( j ) ( 5) is an exception section taking
or sifting out from the right to receive benefits, certain
persons who otherwise corp.e within the act, as crendering personal services for wages' and is not a test
to determine whether the relationship v;:as a service
one.''
H

tt (

u

t

Under this summary, then, we are confronted with a twofold problem: ( 1) Were the individuals in question performing ccpersonal services" for ccwages" for the plaintiff; and ( 2)
if the relationship was one of the performance of personal
services for wages, has the employer satisfied all three of the
exclusion tests which are provided in Section 19 (j) ( 5) (a),
(b) & (c).
(A) In the first paragraph as regards the question of
whether or not the lessees were performing services ccin em-·
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ployment" for ((wages," the matter seems to be settled by the
stipulation entered into between counsel for the parties which
stipulation and the legal effect thereof is referred to on pages
3 and 4 of the petitioner's brief. This court's decisions in the
cases of National Tunnel & Mines .Corp. vs. Industrial Commission, 99 Utah 39:102 Pac. 2d 514, and Combined Metals
Reduction Co. et al vs. Industrial Commission, 101 Utah, 230;
116 Pac. 2d 929, found that ((lessees" such as are involved
herein were performing services ((in employment" for ((wages."

(B)

Concerning the question as to whether or not the
truckers were performing services under the service relationship
as defined, there appears to be little doubt these individuals
were performing services for the company for wages pursuant
to an oral agreement whereby they agreed to use their own
trucks and to haul ore and waste on a per-tonnage basis. The
record shows that the matter of their performance was fully
explored by the Appeal Referee, with the company having full
opportunity to present facts concerning the matter at issue.
There is no proof by the company that in the performance of
services these individuals could be shown to come within the
exclusion provisions of Section 19 (j) ( 5). To the contrary,
they were employed for an indefinite period of time and the
employment could be terminated at any time by the company.
All of their services were performed under the express direction of -other company employees as to the point from which
the ore was to be hauled, when it was to be hauled, and where
it was to be dumped or unloaded. The ore hauling was a
necessary integrated part of the company's mining operation
and was done primarily on the company's premises. The in10
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dividuals engaged in the hauling were, for the most part,
former employees of a trucking company and were not in any
sense of the word according to the testimony independently
established in a business of the same nature as was involved
m their performance of services for The Snyder Mines.
Since the decision of the Industrial Commission is fully
supported by facts, it becomes the duty of this court to determine whether or not the Commission has made a proper
application of the law. We submit that the conclusion of the
Commission is the only one which could have been made in
light of the facts.
(C) In view of the previous decisions of this court and
the well settled formula of the law, we fail to see wherein the
company has made a case for the exclusion of the ~ervices of
E. H. Snyder. The testimony and the record shows that
Snyder's time was fully occupied in his services as Vice President
and Manager of the Combined Metals Reduction Company
and his technical services which were performed for the Snyder
Mines. The testimony of Neil Snyder, Manager of The Snyder
Mines, Incorporated, and the record shows that E. H. Snyder's
services were paid for by means of a regular monthly salary. He
was performing services in a service relationship for wages even
though such services were confined primarily to the giving
of technical advice with reference to the interpretation of
general ore trends in the mine operation. The company ~on
tends that his technical services were given pursuant to an established profession as metallurgist and were made possible by
his superior knowledge of mining operations. We submit
that this very fact formed the basis for the company's use
11
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of his services. There has been no showing by the company
that he was independently established in a profession. Nowhere does the testimony indicate that E. H. Snyder held
himself out to the general public as a professional man. In
fact the record shows that he did not perform similar services
for companies other than Combined Metals Reduction Company
and the Snyder Mines. The Commission correctly concluded
that Snyder was performing services pursuant to a service
relationship for wages (by means of a monthly salary) and
that the exclusion provisions of Section 19(j) {5) ·had not
been met.

II.
THE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT CONFERRING
JURISDICTION ON THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
TO ASSESS AND COLLECT UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATON CONTRIBUTIONS DID NOT VIOLATE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.
The petitioner argues that the Employment Security Act
is in violation of Article 13, Section 11 of the Utah constitution
which provides in part: ((The State Tax Commission shall
administer and supervise the tax laws of the state."
This court in its decision in the case of Singer Sewing
Machine Company vs. Industrial Commission, supra, stated,
referring to previous opinions regarding the Employment Security Act: (The examination of these opinions reveals that
the members of this court are committed to the following:
(a) The unemployment compensation law was enacted under,
t

12
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and as an exercise of the police power of t~e state; (b) its
purpose is remedial to protect the health, morals, and welfare
of the people by providing a cushion against the shocks and
rigors of unemployment; (c) being remedial under the police
power and not imposing limitations on basic rights, it should
be liberally construed.''
It is of importance to observe that Article 13, Section 11
of the Utah constitution refers to ((tax laws." Thus, the constitution does not purport to give exclusive jurisdiction to the
Tax Commission with respect to the administering and supervision of all laws involving compulsory payment. The constitution avoids the ambiguity. inherent in the use of the common
word ((taxes" and conveys the impression that the Tax Commission's jurisdiction is limited to lavvs which are imposed exclusively by virtue of the taxing power of the state.· This is clearly
evidenced by the legislative expression of this provision of
the state constitution. For example, the monies paid by employers into the State Insur~nce Fund under the Workmen's
Compensation law (a law which is predicated on the exercise
of the police povver of the state, Utah Fuel Company vs. Industrial Commission, 57 Utah 246, 194 P. 122, 124), are not
collected _or administered by the State Tax Commission.
Similarly, under the Fish and Game laws the Fish and Game
Commissioner collects fees and license monies and determines
liability independently of the Tax Commission. These fees
and monies are deposited by th~ Commission in a special fund
which is administered by him separately and apart from the
general funds of the state which are collected under the
"taxing laws."

13
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The Department of Registration likewise collects monies
and determines issues of liability with respect to many matters
entrusted by the legislature to it for supervision, administration
and control. .
The line which distinguishes an exerctse of the police
power from an exercise of the taxing power is difficult to
draw, but notwithstanding these difficulties, there are criteria
available for determining whether a general statute falls on
one side of the line or the other.
- There is no validity to the argument that the Utah En1ployment Security Act is a ccrevenue act" or that revenue is
the primary purpose of the law and that regulation which is
inherent in the police power of the state is merely incidental.
The Act provides for an unemployment compensation fund
ccwhich shall be administered separate and apart from all
public monies or funds of the state," and which is to be administered by the State Treasurer not in his regular capacity
but ((as ex-officio treasurer and custodian." The fund consists
of all contributions collected under the Act, and the Industrial
Commission is vested with full power authority and jurisdiction
over the fund. Contributions collected are deposited in the
Federal Unemployment Trust Fund and are requisitioned
therefrom by the Industrial Commission (through the treasurer
acting as its fiscal agent) from time to time in such amounts
as it deems necessary for anticipated benefit payments. When
requisitioned, such monies are required to be deposited in the
unemployment compensation fund in a special benefit account,
and benefits are to be paid therefrom in accordance with such
14
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regulations as the Industrial Commission rna y prescribe. The
monies may be used only to pay benefits.
It is apparent that the system of collection and the payment of benefits contemplated by the legislature differs
fundamentally and radically from that set up by statute for
the collection of general taxes. It is significant that the contributions collected never become a part of, nor are they ever
mingled with the public funds of the State or its Treasury,
which are avail~ble for defraying the general expenses of
government. The legislature had in min~ the integrated
nature of the whole unemployment program when it designated
the Industrial Commission as the agency which would be
charged with the duty of collecting contributions.
The individual worker, when filing a claim for benefits,
depends for his eligibility and duration upon the earnings
which he has had from covered employers, which earnings have
been reported to the Industrial Commission, and contributions
paid thereon. If he has· no earnings or has insufficient earnings
from employers who are subject to _the Act, he, of course, does
not fall in that class of individuals who are entitled to the
protection of the Act. It is logical to assume that there may be
proper and efficient administration only when the power to
determine the eligibility of the claimant and the contribution
due from the employer (as a result of the employer having
individuals in covered employtJ1ent) is given to a single administrative agency or department.
As Justice Wolfe pointed out in his concurring opinion
in the case of National Tunnel & Mines Company vs. Industrial
Commission, supra:

15
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C<I think that when the fact of ·employment' is found
for the purpose of determining benefits, it is meant to
be binding as to the question of determination of ·contributions' . . .''
He further stated:
C<If the Industrial Commission may be sure that the
appeal to this court from its findings as to that appli. cant will set the question at rest, it will be guided by
the decision in said appeal in determining the question
of benefits for the entire class. There is some chance,
at least, to obtain in such proceedings a decision of
this court before the Fund is depleted by many payments
to alleged employees whose alleged employers need
not contribute.''
Justice Wolfe pointed out in his opinion:
··where one of two constructions of the law would
render an act unworkable or only haltingly workable,
or would fail to effectuate the obvious intent of the
legislature and another contribution equally or nearly
as feasible would bring opposite results, it is our duty
to adopt the latter. I see nothing in logic or precedent
that requires us to accept the construction of the tnain
opinion. This is a case in which we are dealing ·with
the administration of a public act designed to benefit
a class and society as a whole by cushioning the effect
of unemployment. It is not the case of a private controversy involving only the rights of A against B."
See also The Best Foods Co. vs. Christensen, 75 Utah
392, 285 P. 1001, 1004, and particularly, the cases cited at that
page. See also State vs. Packer Corp., 77 Utah 500, 297 P.
1013; Utah· State Fair Association vs. Green, 68 Utah 251,
249 P. 1016; Wadsworth vs. Santaquin City, 83 Utah 321,
28 P. (2d) 161, 167; Tintic Standard Mining Co. vs. Utah

16
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County, 80 Utah 491, 16 P. (2d) 637; Salter vs. Nelson, 85
Utah 460, 39 P. (2d) 1061; 25 R.C.L., p. 100, et seq., sections
243, 244, 245.
It was further stated in that opinion:
((Certainly there is a distinction between (contributions'
to a fund which is designed for the welfare of a class
and a tax for general purposes although both are
(exactions,' and even though the effect of both is the
same on the tax payer. It i~ important to keep our
nomenclature correct, but more important that our concepts not be confused. It J;Ilay well be that the type
. of contribution which is exacted for the unemployment
insurance fund is not a ttax' in the sense that that term
was used in the constitutional provision which gave
the T-ax Commission administration and supervision
of tax laws. Certainly the contributions may be looked
at as payments into a fund for- specific purposes-the
whole encompassed by the police power even though
not regulatory . . .
·
ttl see no essential difference between a required contribution toward an unemployment insurance fund
and a required payment of a percentage of a pay roll
into a compulsory state insurance fund for disability
compensation as is done in Ohio . . .
((The unemployment compensation act sets up a plan
which places on the employing class the duty of bearing
one of the burdens which the law in its march now
considers one of the hazards of industry, to wit:
unemployment. Disability by accident in industry has
long been considered one of the incidents which industry
must be prepared to meet. Unemployment may be
considered in the same light although in it the relation
of cause and effect is not so clear as in cases of disability
through accident which occurred during employment
Industry may be thought of as responsible for an indi-

17
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

vidual's unemployment in the sense that such unemployment is caused by industry's failure ·to absorb
him ...
''Unemployment is considered a responsibility of industry. Hence, industry is required to contribute to
a fund to relieve it. The whole scheme of unemployment compensation, including the raising of a· fund,
may be considered as an integrated whole, all of which
falls under police power, since only that class which
is employed benefits and only industry, upon v1hom
society puts the direct responsibility, contributes to
alleviate this condition of unemployment of its workers.
In that sense the plan is a unit, an integrated whole,
a self-contained scheme under the police power. If
the general public, regardless of the employer-employee
relationship were taxed, the situation might be different. The difference in the last analysis may be one in
degree between the relation of the unemployed and
industry and the relation of the unemployed and the
public ... "
While the decision in the National Tunnel & Mines case,
supra, did not decide the question as to whether or not the
Industrial Commission might constitutionally determine who
was subject to the payment of unemployment compensation
contributions, we think that the excerpts hereinabove set forth
from Justice Wolfe's concurring opinion outline the real basis
of the matter at issue in the instant case and clearly show
that the contribution which is levied under the Employment
Security Act is not a tax in the sense of the word as used in
the constitution. The legislative intent is further evidenced
by the fact t~at reduced rates of contribution are based upon
the length of time the employer has been in business and upon
the stability of his pay rolls. The theory which is evidenced,
18
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of course, is that the employer who has a relatively stable pay
roll from quarter to quarter and year to year has offered
workers a steady means of income and has not increased the
total unemployment load in the state. The ·employer who
is qualified for a reduced rate may pay ·.as low as .7 of. one
per cent while the employer who is not so qualified is compelled to pay 2. 7 per cent into the unemployment compensation
fund.
We submit that unemployment compensation contributions
are not ((taxes" within the meaning of the constitutional provision. We submit further that it is a well settled principle
of law that an individual who attacks the constitutionality
of a statute must_ show beyond question that the statu_te in its
operation injures him. -This principle has - b~en stated by
this honorable- court in- the cases ot Ex reL Johnson vs. Alexander, 87 Utah 376, 49 P. (2d) 408; and, State vs. Hoffman,
64 P. (2d) 615. See also, Jeffrey Manufacturing Co., vs.
Blagg, 235 U. S. 571, at 575, 576; Gorieb vs. Fox, 274 U. S.
603, 606; Stein vs. Kentucky State Tax Commission, 266 Ky.
469, 99 S. W. (2d) · 443;· Bourjois vs. Chapman, 301 U. S.
183. We fail to see how the company is in any way injuriously
affected by the order of the Commission requiring it to pay
contributions on the earnings of the individuals in question,
since this court has previously, in numerous cases, held that
the intent of the Act was to cover such services as are here
involved.
It is of interest to note that during the period commencing
July 1, 1941 (when the Employment Security Act was changed
to place the responsibility of making collections directly_ on
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the Industrial Commission) and ending August 31, 1949, the
Commission and its representatives have collected for the
unemployment compensation fund $38,438,000. During this
same period, the Cemmission has dispersed through benefits
to eligible claimants $15,166,027.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion we respectfully submit that the individuals,
including lessees, truckers, and E. H. Snyder, involved in
this matter were performing services in employment for the
plaintiff for wages, and we further- submit that the Employment
Security Act, conferring jurisdiction on the Industrial Commission to assess and collect unemployment compensation
contributions, did not violate constitutional provisions.
Respectfully submitted,
CLINTON D. VERNON,
Attorney General
FRED F. DREMANN, Special
Assistant Attorney Gene1'al
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